William Avery, formerly a US diplomat, outlines in this article precisely how India should NOT conduct its affairs for the coming decade. In it, he advises spending absurd amounts of money on foreign expeditions, a huge boondoggle of a navy, and importing talent -  all at the cost of local, organic talent that can deliver results and embed resiliency – now the key to survival and success in these uncertain times.

Bill Roggio has a great read about how Dawood Ibrahim’s D-Company underpins much of the illicit activity in and around India. I laid out the same case in 2008.

The village of Tajnagar, no longer willing to allow the Indian state to direct its economic growth, has embedded its own node into the national railway system.

After lobbying for 3 decades for its own railway station with no success, the village pooled $45,000 under the control of an ad-hoc corporation (the “gram seva samiti” or service committee) and contacted the railway system for system specifications. They then spent two years building a concrete foundation, adding water and electricity, and erecting a ticket counter.

The Indian Railways approved the node and now has seven trains stopping there on a regular basis. Great example of how innovation at the local level can yield MAJOR rewards for those in that community. We have seen this kind of thing before, but never at this level.

This is also an example of how treating the railway system as a PLATFORM (something I spent the summer of 2007 working on) can both enable robust growth as embed resiliency into the system.

Kennji Kizuka of the Human Rights Watch reveals how both sides of the Naxal conflict are utilizing school buildings to the detriment of the students. Here’s some deeper thinking as to the why:

The education system is a core system, alongside the roads, economic activity, social structure etc. Naxals attack it primarily because of this reason – to destroy legitimacy and limit government influence. The CRP’s anti-Naxal operatives however, have to use schools because, in many cases, they are the only defensible buildings (because it was built using central government funding) in the village.

In essence, school systems act as the the feeble skeleton of the nation state.

December 20. Naxals attacked the Balimela power station. The station was already underperforming (on the order of 150MW) but they managed to damage the water intake tunnel and bring the system screeching to a halt.

Interesting:

• Sustainable. In addition to the tunnel, the Naxals used on-site materials to set machinery on fire (rather than bringing their own explosives).
• Information operations. Security personnel were overpowered but not injured. Additionally, propaganda left on the scene warned of supplying the industrial centers (seen as evil) with power.

My friend and colleague Mark has joined the ranks of bloggers who have interacted with the subject of their terrorism blogging. Read his Q+A session here.

In an effort to prevent the use of untraceable cell phones, India has cut off about 25 million (30%) of its phone subscribers who don’t have proper IMEI numbers. Unfortunately, this is also the tier most likely to be used in remote areas by the poorest segment of society.

To crash their only tether to the rest of the system is to sever their lifeline to the promise of a new Indian future. Meanwhile, attackers will simply shift online to secure VOIP systems.

Jody Ray Bennet of the International Relations and Security Network was nice enough to reach out when putting together some research on how India’s PMC market is adapting to new challenges. He did a great job weaving together a few different threads. Go read the article here.

The estimates about the LTTE’s assets and investments range from $500m to $1bn.

Indian intelligence is exploring what links the Naxals have to foreign terrorist outfits. Given the insurgency’s predilection to providing a platform for black market trade, smuggling, and weapons it is more than likely it is also acting as a host nation within a nation for foreign entities. As a host, Naxals can, for a fee, provide a base of operations, training, and equipment. The most likely client for these services is the down-but-not-out LTTE.