In the last four years, this blog has been cited by security professionals, academics (students and professors), and I’ve had the good fortune of being quoted in the press, and working with people who can make decisions that can catalyze change. It has been a lot of fun, rewarding, and hopefully helped.
However, I haven’t been able to give this site sufficient consideration for a while and that will likely remain the case. So it is time to shut the doors. The archive will remain here, but no new content.
That said, I care deeply about the future of India. The country’s current trajectory relies on terrible decision making, gross corruption, and huge systemic flaws to continue. There is an unhappy and unpleasant correction to be had, and the Naxals are a symptom. But there is hope, and more importantly, unprecedented opportunity in an India that embraces a majority of its citizens instead of isolating them. That is something I am thinking about, and will be writing about on a new India-focused site. I don’t know when that will be though. Hopefully soon.
You can still find me at my main site. Please do get in touch, and thanks for your support.
“There has been continuous information of a large numbers of Naxals being sighted. This shows that the Naxals are well-prepared and ready to take on the security forces,” said a senior official.
A ‘reporter’ clearly sat down and transcribed, or was otherwise fed, this? messaging. It is unfortunate that the Times of India chose to run this as either analysis or journalism, it’s hard to tell which. Note that the article is clearly devoid of specifics, but plentiful in government speaking points.
Can this kind of information op work? Sure, but it depends on a level of credibility this clearly lacks.
Total reward available for the group? About $150,000.
On top of the list, General Secretary Ganpati alias Laxman Rao, 61, carries a reward of Rs 24 lakh and is the main ideological pillar behind the Naxals. The dossier lists Ganpati’s family members in Hyderabad, Dharmapuri and Karimnagar districts of Andhra Pradesh.
Number two in the Politburo is Nambala Keshav Rao who comes from a family of government officials with a reward Rs 19 lakh on him. Rao’s brothers are Vigilance and CMD level officers in Andhra Pradesh.
Kishanji, the masked darling of the press, is alive and active in the Orissa-Chhattisgarh forests while his younger brother Mallojula Venugopal is also a Politburo member.
Kattam Sudashan, Bureau Secretary of CPI (Maoist), is the alleged mastermind in April 2010 Dantewada massacre in which 76 security personnel were butchered. Kattam is believed to be still influential in the Dantewada region.
Pulluri Prasad Rao alias Chandranna is the secretary of the North Telangana special zonal committee.
Kishan alias Mahesh is the international face of CPI (Maoist) and believed to be the link between Indian and Nepali Maoists. Kishan is the only Bengali amongst the largely Andhra-dominated outfit.
The Israeli drug lord who ran the billion dollar illicit drug trade in Goa (at the behest of Russian, Israeli, and Nigerian cartels) has been captured in Peru and brought to India. He could give up key associates in politics, police, intelligence, military, as well as his cartel contacts.
Ajai Sahni of SATP and and the Institute of Conflict Management agrees with what I posted a few days ago.
Since the 26/11 Mumbai attacks, moreover, the state police have not significantly improved its preventive CT capabilities. Instead, the focus has, again, been on symbolism such as the setting up of the ‘elite’ Force 1 and the acquisition and positioning of armoured cars at street corners. The crucial imperative of improving general police capabilities has largely been ignored, and the police constable remains essentially what he was ? poorly trained; poorly integrated into the intelligence chain; operating in conditions of extraordinary stress; and held in wide contempt by both the public and his own masters.
Mousetrap security innovation never works. This kind of wasted cognitive effort is marked by a 1:1 response to a particular attack. For examples, examine every policy implemented by America’s TSA in response to hijacking of aircraft. Shoes in particular.
In India the elite National Security Guard was successfully decentralized but the squadron in Mumbai simply stood up on standby, but was not deployed on the scene (again, India’s first responders – fire brigades and ambulance drivers and police, as well as chowkidars, were the primary state response).
Meanwhile, explosives and forensics specialists from the same unit had to be flown in from across the country. Why were they not decentralized as well?